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11 Conclusions
Organized Business Facing 
Internationalization
Wolfgang Streeck and jelle  Visser
U p  to about a decade ago, business associations were an overwhelmingly 
national phenomenon.1 They organized firms or their owners from one 
country only, by sector, region, firm size, religious or political sentiment, or 
generally; lobbied national governments or, in corporatist countries, under­
took to perform functions of public policy; negotiated with trade unions 
from the same country at sectoral, regional or national level — and generally 
participated in both the construction and the regulation o f  national markets, 
in cooperation as well as in conflict with governments and organized labour, 
pursuing the special interest o f  capital as well as contributing to the 
common good of nations, however defined, under capitalism (Cawson 1985; 
Ziegler 1992).
This picture, which dates back as far as the second half of the nineteenth 
century, held pretty much true until the 1980s. It dominated the imagery 
behind the ambitious and influential international research project on business 
interest associations that was started by Philippe Schmitter and Wolfgang 
Streeck in the early 19S0s (Schmitter and Streeck 1999 [19813). Twenty years 
later, it seems clear that rapid and, at the time, more or less unexpected 
progress in the internationalization of capitalist political economies requires 
major revisions in how we think about ‘the associative action of business’ . 
This, at least, is what the vast recent literature on internationalization and 
‘globalization’ implicitly and explicitly suggests. While there were inter­
national associations of business as far back as the early postwar years, there 
were not many of them and their practical significance was doubtful. There 
also were multinational firms, but the typical large firm was national, perhaps 
with subsidiaries abroad. Multinational companies were the exception, not the 
rule, even in sectors such as automobiles, and they were all directed from their 
home base. Organized capital was nationally organized, just like organized 
labour — and what its political role was depended on national traditions and 
institutions, for example on whether these were more pluralist or more 
corporatist (on national traditions, see Crouch 1993).
If  it is true that in the past, business interest associations were closely 
intertwined with the structure and functioning of the nation state, then one 
would expect that their fate under internationalization should be related to
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that o f  the latter. Indeed what hypotheses one may hold with respect to the 
impact o f  internationalization on business interest associations appears very 
much driven by what one believes is happening, or expects will happen, to 
the nation state and the functions o f  economic governance in which the state 
has traditionally been involved. As far as Europe and its supranational 
integration is concerned, many expected for a long time, as a matter of 
course, that the focus o f  interest organization and interest politics would 
shift from the national to the supranational level as integration progressed. 
Here a new system of interest representation would emerge that would 
absorb the old, national systems and duplicate them on a much larger scale 
(Haas 1958; Lindberg 1963; recently Wessels 1997). Later, when European 
integration was recognized to be tightly coupled to a process ot economic 
liberalization, there was speculation that associations would never recover at 
the supranational level what they lost at the national level, and that a system 
of supranational pluralist lobbying, by multinational firms as well as by 
multinational associations, would replace national lobbying and, import­
antly, national corporatist cooperation (Streeck and Schmitter 1991). 
Beyond Europe, economic globalization was believed by many to undercut 
the nation state and, with it, national business associations. Others specu­
lated about emerging, or for that matter desirable, international arrange­
ments for 'global governance’, involving not just states and international 
organizations but also private non-governmental organizations, including 
perhaps business interest associations of national or, more likely, inter­
national constitution.
The dust of globalization is far from having settled, and this will remain 
so for a long time. Yet, for those studying business interest politics, there is 
now enough evidence to conclude that due to the still only vaguely under­
stood complexities of the internationalization process, the pattern under­
lying the transformation o f  organized business defies any simple 
characterization (W ilts 2002), Most students o f  European integration have 
now come to understand that the European nation state is not in any way 
about to be replaced by a European supranational state, and never will be. 
The implication is that, whatever kind of  integration may be in the offing, 
nation states will continue to play a significant role in the governance of the 
European economy, although very likely in ways that differ profoundly from 
the posrwar past. If  nation states survive, however, national business interest 
associations m ight survive, too. Similarly, that free markets do not just 
emerge, but must be instituted by policy and through politics,  could point 
to a lasting if different role for organized business beyond the end of organ­
ized capitalism. Finally, at the global level, while a liberal world market 
governed by a state-free lex mercataria combined with voluntary codes of 
practice for large firms m ight seem an attractive utopia to liberal lawyers 
and neo-liberal economists, it may in practice not suffice to create the sort o f  
order and confidence that are required for worldwide economic growth and 
prosperity. Could business associations come in to fill the gap?
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Compared to entire states, systems of  interest representation and the 
collective actors that inhabit them are small worlds that are easier, although 
by no means easy, to traverse and observe. I f  the response of interest associ­
ations to globalization is as closely aligned with that of the national state as 
one would expect, its study might reveal important insights, not just on the 
politics of organized interests, but also on the evolution of  state governance 
and state capacities and on the relationship between politics and the 
economy under internationalization. W hat is happening to business associ­
ations could, as it were, be read like a l itmus test for what is happening to 
the state. As empirical access to a small world is easier than to a large one, 
the findings this m ight generate could be more realistic and less speculative
— and less driven by wishful thinking — than much of popular writing on 
‘globalization’ . Indeed to the extent that it is possible to study business 
associations diachronically and trace the trajectory along which they are 
changing, approaching globalization by studying the transformation of 
organized business interests m ight yield major insights on how political 
institutions are transforming in the present period o f  worldwide liberaliza­
tion, and on how institutional legacies influence the gradual but neverthe­
less fundamental change that seems to be emblematic of the present period 
of worldwide liberalization.
This volume deals with the internationalization of business interest 
representation, and indirectly of  politics in general, in an actor-centred, 
bottom-up perspective. Rather than studying emergent supranational busi­
ness associations and associative orders above the nation state, it begins its 
approach at the national level where the vast majority o f  business associ­
ations continue to be located, and tries to learn from their behaviour how 
the rules of the game of interest politics are evolving. N o t  only does this 
make it possible to trace the 'path dependence’ o f  change in associations and 
associative orders, enabling the analysis to take into account the past and the 
present as important factors shaping the future. It also allows one to relate 
observed changes in the organizational structures and practices of interest 
associations — i.e. the corporate actors of interest politics — to changes in 
the associative orders that constitute the institutional framework o f  their 
activities.
The present chapter, which summarizes what we believe are the main 
conclusions from the empirical analyses presented in this volume, will 
proceed as follows. Its first part will focus on what seem to be common 
trends in the development o f  business associations at national level. While 
some of  these are directly related to internationalization, for others the rela­
tionship is more indirect, and yet others are not related to inter­
nationalization at all. The main emphasis in this section will be on the ‘logic 
o f  m embership ’ , i.e. the relations between interest associations and the firms 
that they represent.2 An important aspect o f  this will be dealt with in the 
second section, which discusses rhe emergence of large firms as independent 
interest-political actors. Following this, the third section will turn to the
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role o f  business associations in the emerging ‘Europolity ’, which we treat as 
an especially strongly institutionalized example o f  an international arena of 
interest politics. As will be seen, the link is the rise o f  the large m ulti­
national firm, not just as a critical constituent o f  national business associ­
ations, but also as a domestic as well as international interest-political actor 
in its own right. Obviously, the third section will emphasize primarily the 
‘logic o f  influence’, in that it will explore how the — partial — shift o f  eco­
nomic governance to the European level affects the organization and collect­
ive action of  business. Our main finding is that, rather than being absorbed 
by supranational associations, many national business associations extend 
their activities to the supranational, European level, paralleling the efforts 
of, and sometimes intentionally bypassing, their own supranational associ­
ations which remain remarkably restricted in their powers and capacities. By 
way of  conclusion, we relate this observation to the notion o f  ‘Europeaniza­
tion’, both of  politics and o f  political systems.
The national level: business associations under stress
The chapters o f  this volume depict national associations of  business in a 
period of profound change. As such change has proceeded gradually over two 
decades without dramatic disruption, its extent, once fully observed, must 
appear ail the more surprising. The same can be said o f  the fact that a major 
source of change seems to have been pressures from below, com ing from 
members. This reveals a much higher salience of the logic of membership for 
business associations than was believed to be possible in the neo-corporatist 
1970s. Then, it was widely held that interest associations in advanced indus­
trial democracies were evolving to become something like ‘private interest 
governments’, or ‘P IG s ’ (Streeck and Schmitter 1985), governing rather 
than merely representing their members in a process of political exchange 
with powerful interlocutors — governments and trade unions -  in which 
interests had to be diluted in return for their limited but securely guaran­
teed observance in negotiated common policies.
For this, too much member participation was regarded as less than 
helpful. O f  course it was always admitted that given their lower number o f  
members and the considerable resources at the latter’s disposal, business 
associations would likely be somewhat less oligarchic than their trade union 
counterparts. While for most mainstream trade unions extracting a sufficient 
supply of resources from their members seemed to be more difficult than 
maintaining internal discipline, for business associations the reverse 
appeared to be true. Still, the extent to which the members o f  national busi­
ness associations have in recent decades demanded more accountability of 
their leaders and closer a lignment of associational policies to their own per­
ceived interests, refused to continue to provide resources without a visible 
return for themselves, or even deserted their appointed ‘statesmen of indus­
try’ and took their case themselves directly to the public and to political
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authorities, seems remarkable enough to require rethinking of  received 
theories/'
To  what extent and in whac sense the revolt o f  business firms against the 
neo-corporatist PIGgery of the 1970s was driven by internationalization is a 
question that is hard to answer conclusively. A factor that seems to have 
been highly influential is structural change in the membership base o f  many 
business associations, which in turn was partly related to the inter­
nationalization of markets and production systems. Among other things, 
internationalization seems to have caused a sharpening of the traditional 
division between the concerns of small and large firms (see the three country 
chapters and the chapter by Lehmkuhl, this volume), which appears to have 
made the proven methods by which business associations used to manage 
the conflicts between the two groups oi members less effective. Also, 
increasing international division of labour, together with intensified 
competition even in previously domestic markets, seems to have caused a 
wave o f  m ergers that reduced the number o f  firms in the sectors organized 
by established associations.'1 Smaller numbers o f  larger firms are, however, 
more difficult to manage from above than large numbers of small firms. 
Moreover, more and more firms are becoming multinational in structure and 
ownership, and, as we will see below, this posed additional control problems 
from the perspective of  national as well as international business associ­
ations.
Another development that seems to have put pressure on national busi­
ness associations was profound changes in union organization and collective 
bargaining. This, too, reflected international pressures which often issued in 
a decline o f  the industrial sector -- the main organizational base o f  trade 
unionism -  and in different forms of decentralization of wage setting. Due 
to these and other factors, trade unions seem in recent years to have become 
less important and less constraining as interlocutors of business associations. 
This would seem to be behind the tendency, manifested already in several 
countries, to abandon dual organization of trade and employer interests in 
separate, independent associations. Postwar industrial relations ideally 
implied a decoupling of  wages and working conditions from the economic 
situation of the individual firm. Where trade unions were strong this seems 
to have been conducive to organizational dualism on the side of business. 
However, as liberalization in the 1980s and 1990s wrought a recommodifi­
cation of  labour and of the employment relationship, it seemed to make 
sense to business interests to coordinate their collective action in product 
and labour markets more closely, by incorporating previously separate 
employers associations into functionally encompassing, general associations 
of business (cf. W ilts 2002: 103, on the Netherlands)/
As the chapters o f  this book suggest, current developments in different 
national systems o f  business interest organization respond to similar endoge­
nous or identical exogenous stress and as a result resemble each other across 
national boundaries. National differences do not disappear, however, and
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both national systems and the politics o f  change and adjustment remain rec­
ognizably nationally specific over time, despite similar pressures and adap­
tive responses. This is a theme in the three country chapters (on the 
Netherlands, Switzerland and Sweden) and in two of the three comparative 
sector studies (on the chemical industry in Germany and Britain, and on the 
logistics sector in the Netherlands and Germany). That convergence does 
not eliminate divergence and that similar pressures cause reactions that are 
comparable but not identical may be explained by the fact that common 
exogenous constraints are mediated by different national conditions and 
institutions. Also, where responses of national systems are similar, this 
seems to be due to independent co-evolution caused by endogenous influ­
ences rather than to diffusion (see the chapter by Lehm kuhl)/ ’
In the following we will discuss three, as far as we can see, rather univer­
sal responses of national business interest associations to the ongoing secular 
changes in their membership base and in the interests emerging from it. We 
begin with the conspicuous efforts o f  business associations in almost all 
countries to rationalize their organizations, not least in response to demands 
from their members, and cut back on expenses and membership dues. 
Second, we point to an em erging new style of interest representation, espe­
cially by intersectoral business associations, that appears much more ‘plural­
ist ’ — i.e. conflict-oriented and public opinion-centred -  than was deemed 
politically expedient in the corporarist era. Third, we turn to the already 
mentioned slow disappearance, or at least the weakening, of the functional 
division between employer associations and trade associations.
O rga n iza  t io n a l restructu  r in g
A m ong the most striking changes we find in almost all countries is that 
national business associations today experience much more pressure to 
attend to the perceived interests of their members than they did 20 years 
ago (see in particular the chapters by Visser and W ilts and by Grote and 
Schneider, this volume; cf. Boleat 2002). This pertains to the design ot their 
organizational structures as well as to their policies. W ith  respect to both, it 
seems justified to speak o f  a slow but effective movement away from a more 
corporatist towards a more pluralist style oi interest representation. Our 
chapters suggest  that this movement has occurred and is occurring above all 
in response to a significant increase in the heterogeneity of  the membership 
of  associations. The result is sometimes intensive organizational restructur­
ing, trying to combine organizational streamlining with increased provi­
sions for member participation, as well as in a different, more aggressive 
political posture.
Examples o f  this can be found not only in the three country cases pre­
sented in this book. Others come from Germany, where the peak trade 
association of industry, the Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (BD1), 
under the presidency of H ans-O laf Henkel waged a public relations attack
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on corporatism. Similarly in France the rise o f  Ernest-Antoine Selliere to the 
top of  the Confederation Nationale des Patrons and its subsequent renaming 
from the C N P F  into Mouvement des Entreprises (M ED EF) coincided with 
an attempt to recover the initiative from the state and the unions, and with 
a new, more self-confident style of defending the values and spirit of entre- 
preneurialism in public (Bothorel and Sassier 2002).7 In Italy, the appoint­
ment in March 2000  of  Antonio D 'A m ato  as the first leader of  Confindustria 
with a background of small business in the south foreshadowed a far more 
aggressive and right-wing approach to industrial relations than had been 
seen in decades.H What these events had in common was that they signified a 
new self-definition of  business associations, not as intermediaries, but: as a 
straightforward voice of enterprise and entrepreneurialism. In France and 
Italy, and in most federations representing small entrepreneurs, such ‘insur­
rections of  the bosses’ (Helbert 1984) were not infrequent. In corporatist 
Europe, however, developments of this sort were new, and in fact they are 
still unstable, contradictory and, go in g  by the Italian example, not irre­
versible. In the following we will try to account for them as best we can 
given the state of our knowledge.
The past 20  years have wrought new and sharper divisions in the m em ­
bership of  business associations, especially between large and small firms, 
between national and multinational firms, and between firms that are 
nationally and foreign owned. Small firms have often done less well than 
larger ones in confronting the challenges of  internationalization and intensi­
fied competition. One consequence was that large firms tended to be willing 
to maintain good relations with organized labour, whereas small firms felt 
increasingly unable to continue to pay the high wages and social security 
contributions that were a legacy o f  the 1970s (for Germany see Hassel and 
Rehder 2001). Resentment against large firms rose especially where these 
used their dominance in employer associations to negotiate wage settlements 
that secured peace on their own shop floor while the majority o f  smaller 
member firms could not afford them. In sectors like the auto industry, where 
smaller firms did much of  their business producing supplies for large firms, 
more injury, and indeed insulr, was added when large firms demanded lower 
prices from their suppliers because of their increased labour costs, threaten­
ing to turn to foreign sources otherwise. In a country like Germany, conflicts 
like these began to tear apart the powerful employer association o f  the metal 
sector, in that they created almost insurmountable difficulties for its leader­
ship in devising a common policy that maintained the integrity o f  the 
association.
In the 1990s at the latest, small member firms in a large number of busi­
ness associations became highly vocal advocates o f  a political turn towards a 
policy that was much less accommodating o f  trade unions and much more 
insistent with respect to reforms of the welfare state. As small firms became 
more militant, they often began to doubt whether their changing political 
interests would be adequately represented by the large firms that had for so
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long run their associations. Moreover, given their declining satisfaction with 
assodational policies and also their deteriorating economic situation, small 
firms began to demand lower membership dues, causing a resource squeeze 
that was to become a growing concern for association leaders. This was all 
the more so since the larger firms that had always paid the lion’s share of 
assodational budgets were less willing now than in the past to fill the gap. 
Themselves facing more intense competition, many o f  them agreed with the 
smaller members in demanding that associations cut expenses, using a 
rhetoric that was very similar to the general demands by business at the 
time for a cutback of government expenditures.
N ot  that associations did not do their utmost to keep their large member 
firms happy enough to stay on and pay, perhaps, an even larger share of  the 
bill. Some tried to reward continued loyalty by improved opportunities for 
direct voice, through special forums or direct membership arrangements for 
large firms along the British and Dutch models and on the example o f  Euro­
pean peak associations such as U N IC E  and CEF1C (Cowles 1994: 172ff.; 
Grant and Paterson 1994: 142). The reason why this was not, however, the 
ultimate wisdom was that smaller firms, in addition to having become 
stingier, had grown more suspicious of the motives behind the associational 
activities of their larger competitors-cum-customers.9 Also, larger firms had 
in the course o f  internationalization often turned multinational, and appar­
ently this affected their attitude towards their business associations at home. 
From their simultaneous involvement in different national systems of  inter­
est representation, company executives especially from corporatist countries 
learned that firms can sometimes represent their interests on their own or 
have them represented through lobbying firms, instead o f  paying dues to a 
trade association constrained to dilute the special interests of its individual 
members. They were also likely to have seen business associations in opera­
tion that worked with a much smaller staff and focused on a much narrower 
range of core activities than corporatist associations, as a result costing their 
members less.10 It seems that due to these and similar factors, firms through­
out Europe developed a growing anti-bureaucratic sentiment in the 1990s 
against their own associations that culminated in urgent demands for 
internal reforms quite similar to the sort of reforms that firms themselves 
underwent in response to intensifying competition, or those that business 
and political leaders demanded of the public organizations of the welfare 
state.
Similar problems were caused by the growing number of foreign-owned 
firms in the domestic political economies of Europe. They, too, increased the 
heterogeneity of  the constituency o f  national business associations (Grant 
1984: 7) and detracted from the, as it were, natural cohesion of their 
members and potential members that makes for high density o f  association 
membership. For Germany, Jacobi (200.3: 26) shows that foreign-owned 
firms are more likely to join German associations if  they have been present 
in the country for a long time. Especially US firms that have set up their
German subsidiaries only recently, tend not to be members o f  employer 
associations and instead interact with the unions directly if at all. Still , little 
is known empirically about how non-national origin affects a firm’s attitude 
towards, and its depth o f  involvement in, the business associations of  a 
country. Associations themselves seem to have different: policies in relation 
to non-national f irm s. '1 In any case, however, it is likely that the increas­
ingly heterogeneous composition of their constituencies did not make it 
easier for association leaders to unite their members behind a common 
policy (Boleat 2002: 88),
While in terms of internal politics the experience seems ro have been 
similar across national and sectoral boundaries, this does not seem to apply 
to the resource squeeze, which was faced by some associations but not: by 
others. Especially employer associations in countries like Germany and 
Sweden, which have centralized collective bargaining systems, had built up 
considerable funds in the postwar years for supporting their member firms 
in st rikes and lockouts. During the long industrial peace after the end of the 
‘roaring seventies', these funds and the accumulated interest they had earned 
became so large that some associations were in a position to finance their 
operation more or less entirely out of the current proceeds from their 
invested capital. Clearly this dampened the impact o f  the pressure from dis­
satisfied members, at least for a while, and delayed adjustments in organi­
zational structure and practice (Van Waarden 1996: 61). But it also 
stimulated demands from member firms, not just for rebates on their dues, 
but also for new kinds of  activities to be financed from their accumulated 
resources. In a number of  cases, associational savings were used in parr to 
fund expensive public relations campaigns supporting neo-liberal economic 
reform (see below). Since it was mostly employer rather than trade associ­
ations that held accumulated capital, the position o f  the former in relation 
to takeover attempts by the latter was strengthened, counterbalancing the 
declining importance of organized labour and postwar social partnership.
In the long run, however, it seems unlikely that even large savings can 
shield associations from member pressures for organizational restructuring. 
Three tendencies in particular seem to be universal. One is streandiuirig of 
organizational structures, especially where business associations are fragmented 
so that especially larger firms have to join several different associations at the 
same rime. This costs them money, but even more so, rime, and of this they 
have less today than was the case in the less competitive environment of the 
past. The result is a call for mergers between associations, although mergers 
typically increase the diversity of member firms and member interests. 
Further below, we will turn specifically to efforts to amalgamate employer 
and trade associations. At this point it suffices to note that: firms, having 
themselves come under relentless competitive pressures to ‘do more with 
less’, seem to have become much less tolerant than in the past of the compli­
cated interlocking arrangements for interest representation that used to exist 
specifically in corporatist countries.
2 5 0  W . Streeck a n d J . V / • n r
C onch/sions 251
Second, associations seem to have generally grown more attentive lo the 
individual needs of their members, including the smaller ones. This should 
reflect the fact that exit from associations has become less unthinkable even 
in corporatist systems; that entry was always Jess natural tor the growing 
number of firms of foreign origin; and that individual action has become an 
alternative to associative action for a growing number of strategically 
important members and potential members. Business associations today 
seem to be spending more resources than ever on services that accrue directly 
and exclusively to their membership (see the chapters by Schneider and 
Grote and by Visser and W ilts ,  this volume). Of course such ‘outside 
inducements’ to membership and participation are by no means new (Olson 
1965); but it seems that reliance on them has increased as some of the 
collective goods provided by business associations, especially the procure­
ment of labour peace, have lost importance. An interesting example for the 
introduction of new instruments o f  participation, service provision and com ­
munication is Gesamtmetall,  the huge employer association of the German 
metal engineering industry. Faced with desertion by small and m edium ­
sized member firms that would no longer be bound by the sectoral collective 
agreement, Gesamtmetall created a set of sister organizations, run out of its 
offices', that formally are not a party to collective bargaining (the so-called 
OT-Verhande; Zim mer 2002: 99ff.). Covering the entire territory of the 
country, these can be joined by firms from the sector which desire individual 
.services as employers -  such as advice in questions of labour law -  but not 
collective representation vis-a-vis trade unions.
Third, organizational restructuring often includes business associations 
setting up and awning commercial firms that provide services, such as consulting, 
at market prices to members and sometimes also to non-members. Using 
language suggested  by Schim tter and Streeck in the early 1980s (Schmitter 
and Streeck 1999 [1981]) ,  what one observes here is a tendency for business 
associations to turn from interest intermediaries into ‘ interest firms’. This 
tendency is already evident where associations supplement, as they increas­
ingly do, funding by contributions with various forms of charging for spe­
cific services provided. Provision o f  com m ercial services may be combined 
with, and based on the results of, surveys of (panels) of member firms. 
Together with increased use of the Internet, such surveys seem to have 
become a regular instrument especially for Dutch associations for tapping 
the needs and views o f  the membership, replacing the more traditional 
forms of associationa! democracy such as meetings and voting (W ilts  2002: 
108; Boleat 2002: 95).
Generally speaking, there can be no doubt that the renewal in the past 
two decades of the spirit of capitalism has not left the formerly often bureau­
cratic and sometimes state-like associations of capital untouched. More than 
ever, business association staff are now expected to behave 'businesslike' and 
act ‘entrepreneurially’. This means not just faster decisions and more visible 
attachment to modern business ideology, but also a willingness to earn their
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own income, and that o f  their associations, in the marketplace rather than as 
authoritative ‘private interest governments’ — by developing innovative 
‘products’ that meet the demands o f  members which, ominously, are now 
increasingly being referred to as customers’.
The fwst-corjwratist politics o f liberalization
Liberalization, the dominant theme of political economy since the late 
1980s, means disengagement of  politics, especially democratic politics, from 
the economy. It involves a change towards an economic policy that is non- 
discretionary, rule-based and, above all, shielded from electoral influence. O f  
course, installing and defending a non-political economic policy is as such a 
profoundly political undertaking: it requires a difficult: and often conflictual 
dismantling of  interventionist institutions and practices, as well as the pre­
carious building of new institutions that protect governments against 
inevitable temptations to return to non-liberal interventionism. It is in this 
kind of politics that business associations seem to have increasingly engaged 
during the past two decades.
In part, the neo-liberal turn of the politics of business interest seems to be 
a response to changed external circumstances. International, and especially 
European, prohibitions on 'state aids’ , instituted to open up national 
markets for international trade, limit the potential benefits chat firms can 
derive from corporatist insiderism. The same applies to the disappearance of  
national schemes of corporatist market management, like for example in the 
Swiss dairy industry (Wagemann 2004). Often internationalization caused a 
shift from corporatist to state regulation since public government can more 
easily than private government be held accountable internationally for the 
opening up of  national markets. Thus internationalization may paradoxically 
strengthen the national state (Lutz 1998). As state-supported associative 
orders vanished, business associations needed to look for new activities. 
Public advocacy of  economic liberalization partly filled the bill and provided 
general, cross-sectoral business associations in particular with a new role in 
which to impress their membership, on the background of a new politics of 
national political systems in which neo-corporatist self-government was on 
the retreat. Plow effective working on public opinion could be was amply 
demonstrated by the activities o f  business-funded think tanks and public 
relations agencies in the pluralist democracies of the United States and the 
United K in gdom  in the Reagan and Thatcher years.12 Gradually this sort o f  
publicly visible political activity assumed more weight for business associ­
ations as the potential gains from neo-corporatist cooperation behind the 
scenes declined.
Business associations did, of course, not just react to liberalization. In fact 
many of  them were a driving force behind it. W ith  hindsight it can be seen 
that at some point in the 1980s European business became tired of the 
corporatist discipline imposed on it by trade unions and social democratic
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parties in the wake o f  the labour unrest o f  the late 1960s. Inter­
nationalization sprang from many sources, certainly including technological 
and economic ones. But it also came to be promoted by business as a way 
out oi the ever more demanding conditions, and the profit squeeze associated 
with them, to which business had been subjected inside national regimes. 
The way large firms, acting through their own ‘roundtables’ as well as 
through national and European business associations, contributed to the 
decision to speed up the creation of  a Single Market is well-documented (van 
Apeldoorn 2002: 68). U p  to the present day, given the lasting fragmenta­
tion of European politics and democracy by an established system o f  nation 
states, internationalization remains tightly coupled to liberalization, both 
within national economies where discretionary intervention is increasingly 
outlawed as unfair competition, and in the international arena where courts 
of law and technocratic agencies take the place o f  popular democracy.
Turning towards pluralist lobbying of domestic publics for liberal reform 
had a number of  virtuous effects for national business associations. Above 
all, it alleviated their 'policy squeeze’ by solidifying their support from 
increasingly heterogeneous and demanding memberships to whom liberal­
ization represents a collective good that everyone can find desirable. N e o ­
liberal rhetoric tends to appeal especially to the owner-managers o f  small 
and medium-sized firms, the constituency that had grown most critical of 
established business associations in the 1980s and 1990s (W ilts 2002: 
105fh; Z im m er 2002: 99ff-)- (Those who still need and actively seek specific 
government support can agree to the unifying rhetoric while continuing to 
lobby the state behind the scenes.) Public campaigning for liberalization 
also offered associations a way to spend part o f  their accumulated resources, 
hoping that this would quel! demands for the money to be returned to the 
members. Gesamtmetall,  the employer association of the German metal 
engineering industry, today expends no less than € 1 0  million per year on a 
highly professional and sophisticated public relations campaign, New Soziale 
Marktwirtschaft (‘N ew  Social Market Economy’), in which the association 
itself is hardly visible at all. This effort is all the more remarkable since this 
sort of activity is not really part of the mission o f  an employer association, 
not to mention a sectoral one, and would normally have to be undertaken by 
an association such as the B D I (the Federal Association of  German Industry). 
Other examples o f  the same kind are easily found, for instance in France 
where the renamed Mouvement des Entreprises de France (M EDEF) organ­
ized several large gatherings, of up to 3 ,000 employers, to defend ‘the 
freedom of entrepreneurship’ . In the same spirit, the organization launched 
an annual Summer University in 1999, in an attem pt to assert its new role 
as teacher of a revived capitalist ethos.
Internationalization, one might think, makes firms, and especially the 
larger firms that are adopting an increasingly international perspective, 
lose interest in their countries o f  origin. But this does not seem to be the 
case at all. Here our Dutch, Swiss and Swedish case studies are particularly
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instructive  as they deal with small countries whose economics have long 
been among the most international ones. In all three countries, and in 
Switzerland and Sweden in particular, national peak associations o f  business 
have devoted and continue to devote enormous resources to influencing 
public opinion in favour of opening up and liberalizing the domestic 
economy, apparently with the full support of their highly internationalized 
large member firms.13 The explanation seems to be that precisely as firms 
venture across national borders into the international economy, they develop 
a strong interest in a favourable business environment at home, including a 
public opinion that accepts the domestic restructuring necessary for inter­
national competitiveness. Very likely, firms also feel they need the support 
o f  their home state in the politics o f  the international marketplace. National 
associations, in particular cross-sectoral trade associations, obviously con­
tinue to be important instruments for business in creating and securing con­
ditions at home that are supportive of  their growth into the world economy. 
Moreover, large and multinational firms, if  they want to be effective in 
democratic politics, seem to need associations that also represent a fair 
number of smal l firms.
The decline o f dual organization
For a long time dual organization of business interests in trade and employer 
associations was typical o f corporatist countries, where trade unions were 
strong and industrial relations were largely autonomously governed by the 
organized ‘social partners’ . Dual organization remained alien to Britain and 
Ireland, despite some early attempts at functional differentiation, as well as 
to southern Europe. In the first case business associations served mainly as 
lobbyists and, to some extent, as providers o f  services, while industrial rela­
tions remained under the control o f  individual firms and a large number of  
small, often competing unions. In the second case business associations were 
always highly politicized, and relations between capital and labour were 
mediated through social movements, political parties and the politics o f  the 
state. In neither case were business associations involved in centralized 
industrial relations, and hence functional differentiation was a luxury that 
they could do without.
One of the most striking developments in recent years was that separate 
employer associations at the national peak level disappeared in a great 
number of  countries, including D enmark (1.991), Norway (1989), Finland 
(1993), Switzerland (2000) and Sweden (2001), which followed the early 
lead of  the U K  (1965) and the Netherlands (1968). This seems to have left 
Germany as the only country where dual organization at the peak level sur­
vived.1' At sectoral level separate employer associations continue to exist, just 
as they have for a long time in the Netherlands. In many countries, however, 
again excluding Germany with its generally frozen institutional structures, 
there were numerous mergers between employer and trade associations also
Conclusions 255
in individual sectors, resulting in functionally mixed associations of one sort 
or other. We have already touched on what we think are some of the reasons 
for this. More detailed discussion is found in Traxler’s chapter and in the 
three country chapters in this volume. W hat follows is a brief review o f  the 
main points that seem to be relevant here.
For one thing, the integration o f  employer and trade interests in one 
organization appears to be part o f  the ongoing streamlining o f  business asso- 
ciational systems. As we have seen, firms seem to have become less tolerant 
in the 1990s than they were in the past o f  what they increasingly perceive as 
duplication of effort, leading them to demand reductions in the time and 
money association members are asked to contribute. Internationalization o f  
firms has added to this as it has undermined the sectoral and national basis 
for collective agreements which, in an internationalizing economy, can no 
longer take wages out o f  competition. Employer associations, but also the 
industrial relations sections inside general business associations, are therefore 
increasingly less able to serve as instruments of collective market gover­
nance. It is true that the need for associations lobbying against European or 
national social legislation may have grown, just as associations may have to 
play a role in inspiring and servicing firms and their human resource m an­
agers in local negotiations with unions and employee representatives. That 
role, however, seems to be better performed, from a business point of view, 
by organizations placing social and employment issues in the context o f  the 
general economic interests of firms.
Another factor seems to be increases in firm size due to mergers, which 
force the remaining firms to bear a larger share of the burden of  collective 
action, while at the same time requiring them to coordinate their simultane­
ous involvement in several associations and, where they exist, in several sec­
toral collective agreements. As has been seen, the only country that thus far 
escaped the trend towards merger o f  trade and employer associations is a 
large country, Germany — which is also, together with Japan , the only large 
country featuring an elaborate institutional organization of  its market 
economy. German exceptionalism with respect to the trend towards func­
tional de-differentiation may indicate that small absolute size o f  associations
-  and perhaps a secular increase in the m in im um  size required for associ­
ations effectively to provide services to their members -  may have con­
tributed to the decisions in smaller countries to abandon functional 
differentiation.15 Similar factors may also explain why dual organization d is­
appeared so early in Belg ium  and the Netherlands even though these are 
corporatist countries. Both are not just small, but in addition they are also 
divided by religion and, in the Belgian case, regions. When dual organi­
zation was abandoned in the Netherlands in 1968, this was partly in 
response to pressure from large firms dissatisfied with having to pay dues in 
general as well as in denominational organizations.
Perhaps the main force enabling business interests to abandon dual 
organization was the general weakening o f  organized labour in the 1990s
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and the attendant tendency towards decentralization of collective bargain­
ing. The Swedish case is highly instructive here. Growing cost-consciousness 
o f  members oi business associations coincided with demands by firms for a 
reorientation of  activities towards lobbying, public relations, direct services 
to members and more effective presence on the European and international 
scene, building up pressure to end dual organization and double member­
ship. Thar such pressure was actually heeded was due to the decline of the 
economic clout of the unions. But it was probably also strategically aimed at 
contributing to that decline, as had been the withdrawal of Swedish business 
at the end of the 1980s from the corporatist labour market policy boards 
(Martin 1 997: 2 7 8 ff.), N o t  only do weaker unions require fewer resources on 
the part o f  business associations for negotiations and, in particular, conflict 
insurance. D ism antling or, for that matter, refusing to create a specialized 
employer association also makes capital unavailable for union and govern­
ment attempts at ‘concertation’ and prevents unions from establishing or 
defending an institutionalized role in regulating the labour market.10
In the Swedish case, there are reasons to believe that in withdrawing 
from centralized bargaining and national corporatism, employers killed 
two birds with one stone: regaining the support of those member firms 
that had grown most critical of associational policies, as well as denying 
the trade unions the political power that had become the undesirable side- 
product of decades o f  centralized bargaining. Where employers are still 
prepared to participate in national forum s and make pacts with the unions 
and the government, agreements tend to be non-binding, making expen­
sive negotiation and governance machinery dispensable and allowing for 
the functions of employer and trade associations to be carried out by one 
organization. The same applies at the sectoral level. When sectoral agree­
ments turn into non-binding recommendations, this is, as the case o f  the 
British engineering industry shows, likely to be the beginning of  the end 
of separate employer associations.
Generally, we have already noted that today, social policies are more diffi­
cult to separate from economic policies and must prove their economic use­
fulness. The same applies to working conditions in relation to the economic 
situation of  the individual firm. It is widely accepted that this is behind the 
trend for a conversion of industrial relations into ‘H um an Resource Manage­
m ent ’, accompanied by deinstitutionalization of industrial relations as a 
separate policy sector or ‘subsystem’. As this process advances, as it has in 
western Europe in the past decade, separate employer associations are likely 
to be seen as redundant by business firms, and their reduced tasks may be 
taken over by functionajJy amalgamated associations, with the benefit of 
potentially significant organizational economies of scale.
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The rise of the large firm
Business associations have always been particularly responsive to the special 
interests of large firms. W ithout their financial and personal contributions, 
most associations, whether employer or trade associations, would not have 
the resources they need to perform their mission, including representing and 
servicing their small and medium-sized members. It is not surprising, there­
fore, that business associations are more often than not run by their large 
member firms. Frequently the president of an association comes from a large 
company, or the secretary-general is selected by the large member firms, or 
only with their consent. Many associations also provide arrangements for 
their larger members to meet separately, in round tables or special com m it­
tees, to articulate their specific interests and impress them on the associ­
ation’s leadership. In return, large firms may, in addition to paying their 
regular dues, sponsor special projects either financially or by temporarily 
seconding staff to the association’s office. Obviously where this happens, 
associations become even more dependent on their large members and are 
even more constrained to do their utmost to maintain and, if  possible, 
increase the satisfaction of the latter with their policies and services.
in many ways, binding large firms seems to have become more difficult 
for business associations. A variety o f  authors have noted the emergence of 
large, mostly international firms as independent interest-political actors, on 
the national as well as the European and the global level (Coen 1997; 
Coleman, this volume; Cowles 1994; Ronit, this volume). Rather than 
letting themselves be represented by business associations -  and necessarily 
allow the latter to aggregate their individual interests into a common group 
interest -  firms have more than ever begun to lobby political institutions 
and decision makers directly, either through newly created special depart­
ments for ‘political relations’ or by employing professional lobbyists. This 
practice was always well known in pluralist countries with weak business 
associations and sectional trade unions, and with governments that were 
traditionally highly accessible to individual firms as distinguished from rep­
resentatives o f  entire sectors or industries. Even here, however, Wyn Grant 
(1.984) observed as early as the 1980s a tendency for large firms to expand 
their political relations operations and begin on an unprecedented scale to 
take their interests into their own hands. Today it appears that large firms in 
corporatist countries have followed their lead and act much more frequently 
than they used to in the past as interest-political ‘free agents’.
'Fhis does not necessarily mean that large firms are giving up employer or 
trade association membership. In fact they do not normally resign from 
associations even if they are extremely critical o f  how they are run. Typically 
large firms prefer voice over exit, putting pressure on the leadership 
or moving their own staff into leading associational positions. This is 
because exit may cut them off from information and informal networks 
essential for exercising influence. In national systems with centralized
258 W. Streak a n d J . Visser
collective* bargaining, like Germany, large firms even have a vital interest in 
belonging to an employer association as this protects them from wage 
demands that would reflect their superior ability to pay. In fact, even inter­
national companies normally do not discourage membership in national 
business associations. Apparently they leave it to local management, and 
headquarters may often not even know (Grant 1984: 7; Greenwood 2003). 
Few multinational companies seem to look at membership in business 
associations in a strategic way, from the perspective o f  whether to concen­
trate resources on particular national, European or global associations (Boieat 
2002: 93). O f  course, this may change and more firms may follow the 
example of M cDonald ’s, which is among the very few international com ­
panies that have a general policy of not becoming involved in national busi­
ness associations.
It is therefore not primarily a problem of membership that most business 
associations have with large international firms, but rather one of discipline. 
As small and medium-sized firms have lost confidence in the intentions of  
large firms, the extent to which associations can cater to the special interests 
of the latter would appear to have become more l im ited .17 As we have seen, 
one way in which this conflict is being resolved is associations focusing more 
than before on public lobbying for neo-liberal policies in general, like the 
German BD I in the 1990s under the leadership of a representative o f  a very 
large multinational company (H ans-Olaf Henkel of IB M ) . ia But the less spe­
cific the polices o f  business associations become, for internal or external 
reasons, and the more their public pronouncements celebrate the virtues o f  
free markets in which there is no place for special political favours to 
national champions or ail ing firms, the more of  a need large firms may feel 
to open up additional avenues for themselves to make their particular inter­
ests heard. This, we believe, is a main reason why so many o f  them, includ­
ing firms from corporatist countries, have begun to develop, in addition to 
their still carefully cultivated capacity to organize  and direct collective 
action through associations, a variety of instruments of direct intervention 
with policy makers on their own behalf, such as exclusive Business Round 
Tables o f  selected national or international corporations, or representative 
offices in national capitals or in Brussels.
Several of the forces that have propelled this development have already 
been mentioned. Internationalization is one of  them, as it may offer firms 
from corporatist systerns opportunities to observe and imitate the weaker 
collective solidarity and the more aggressive individual lobbying of their 
competitors or subsidiaries under pluralist regimes. Similar to general man­
agerial practices, indications are that internationalization of firms de facto 
often means Americanization. Both multinational and national firms alike 
seem to learn the same lesson, of less discipline and more political individu­
alism, as they begin to represent their interests at the European level in 
Brussels where the style o f  relations between decision makers and industry 
differs from the corporatist model and comes much closer to the pluralist,
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Anglo-American pattern (for an example from the early 1990s see Cowles 
1994: 182).
Second, cross-national mergers and takeovers may produce large ‘d isem - 
bedded firms’ (Pestoff, this volume) that may be less comfortable with, or 
care less lor, the traditional ‘ciubbiness’ o f  national business associations, 
again especially in corporatist countries or institutional arrangements. It is 
true, as the Dutch case in particular shows, that associations can adjust to 
the demands of large multinational firms and may, with innovative prac­
tices, manage effectively to integrate them. Still, as pointed out by Traxler 
(this volume), cross-national mergers disturb sectoral and national identities 
and loyalties, and while this may not make firms resign or abstain from 
membership, it is likely to change their attitude towards it. Large firms, 
which increasingly tend to be multinational, may opt more than before to 
locate parts of their activities in other countries. Very likely, their attitude 
towards national interest intermediation will be more instrumental and non­
committal and will include a general readiness to ‘go  it on their own' if  asso- 
ciational policies are not to their liking. The more often this happens, the 
more one would expect corporatist cultures of associative action to be m odi­
fied in a pluralist direction.
Third, it seems that corresponding changes are taking place in the prac­
tices and habits of the political interlocutors of business in national govern­
ments and international agencies, which constitute the opportunity 
structure o f  business interest politics and define its logic o f  influence. 
Increasingly, even in corporatist countries, politicians and public officials 
seem to be willing to speak to representatives o f  large firms directly, espe­
cially i f  these happen to be prominent. Publicly visible contacts with the 
leaders of big firms, unlike corporatist-style closed-door meetings, bestow 
on politicians an aura of entrepreneurialism, which they today believe they 
need for creating an attractive image of  themselves and the entire political 
enterprise. Direct contacts between business interests and political decision 
makers, instead of relations mediated through associations or corporatist 
institutions, gain importance in national polities also due to deregulation 
weakening collective representation; to the rise of new sectors without estab­
lished sectoral organizations, such as information and telecommunications 
technology; or the expectations oi and the attention given to foreign firms. 
Push and pull come together as top managers learn at business school and 
from their, increasingly Anglo-American, role models how to build direct 
relations with politicians and governments. Both opportunities and tem pta­
tions for large firms to bypass associations have increased in the national as 
well as the international arena; one might think o f  the Davos gatherings and 
similar forums. This implies, incidentally, that the very firms whose 
resources are most needed by associations are becoming less dependent 
on them and, as a result, are less available to be drafted into contributing 
to their organizational capacities. This point, which has been made regard­
ing the relationship between large firms and European-level business
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associations (Coen 1997; Cowles 1994), applies certainly at the global level 
(see the chapters by Ronit and Coleman) and is also true at the national 
level.
The emergence of large firms as independent interest-political actors 
inevitably gives rise to a new kind of duplication of effort, this time between 
associations and their most potent members. But, unlike in the case of 
imperfect: functional differentiation between employer and trade associ­
ations, there are few complaints to be heard. Associations, of course, might 
resent that their large member firms spend growing amounts of resources on 
pursuing their special interests, instead of contributing to the general inter­
est of the industry or o f  capital as a class. Association officials know, 
however, that they have no choice but to take what is given to them, and 
continue to do their utmost to serve the interest of their large members in 
whatever they can still offer in return. That large firms flexibly and oppor­
tunistically shift between a variety of modes of making their interests heard, 
from individual lobbying to collective action, from national to supranational 
action and back, and if necessary from one national arena and associacional 
system to the next, is now more or less taken for granted (Greenwood 2003: 
119). ‘Solidarity’ is often demanded of business firms by their associations, 
but it is generally understood that it is only rarely supplied. After ail, busi­
ness firms are supposed to be pursuing their individual interests, and their 
associations are there to ensure that they can do just that. Small firms, too, 
know where the money is. Jn times o f economic turmoil, when their large 
competitors are getting ready to cut their throats, they may dream of organ­
izing separately in a Poi/jndiste-style movement of their own. But reality 
being as it is, it usually offers them a choice only between having little 
influence in associations with much influence dominated by large firms, and 
having much influence in associations of only small firms that have only very 
little influence.
T h e  E u r o p e a n  lev e l :  n e w  c o m p l e x i t i e s
Economic internationalization in Europe was from early on and continues to 
be accompanied by supranational integration of  political institutions. The 
past two decades saw the slow emergence of a new, Europe-wide political 
system sm generis, one that exists on top of and in addition to the national 
systems. Together with these, it forms an international multilevel system of 
political-economic regulation, which greatly adds to the complexities of 
interest politics in European countries. In the following we will briefly sum ­
marize, first, what we know about the institutional and organizational struc­
ture of interest representation in the European Union. Second, we will in 
particular look at the consequences of multilevel interest representation for 
national business associations. Third, we will briefly explore the relevance of 
our findings for what could reasonably be meant by that much used concept, 
Europeanization.
Convh/uons 261
Interest representation at European level
Early integration theory, developed in the mixed economy world of the 
1950s and 1960s, expected business associations to be among the driving 
forces of European integration, with functional representation preceding and 
pulling forward territorial representation through parties and parliaments 
(Haas 1958: 9ff., 16; Lindberg 1963: 101). More or less, the imagery 
informing neo-functionalist perspectives on integration was one o f  a supra­
national!)' organized ‘modern capitalism ’ (Shonfield 1965), with an orderly, 
essentially corporatist system of  supranational interest intermediation 
absorbing and in the long run replacing the national systems of member 
states.
By the end of  the twentieth century, it had become clear that this was not 
the direction in which united Europe was moving. The logic of influence for 
organized interests that had over the decades established itself in Brussels 
differed profoundly from that of postwar neo-corporatism (Screeck and 
Schmitter 1991). In the 1970s at the latest:, the European Community had 
turned into a site of extensive lobbying in the Anglo-American style. This 
was reinforced with British accession, when British firms extended their 
domestic practice of direct relations with government agencies to the supra­
national authorities of what was soon to become the European Union. Euro­
pean business associations, which began to be created as early as the 
m id-1950s, soon had to share access to European authorities with represen­
tatives of large firms and professional lobbyists, often American law firms. 
As mentioned above, while it is widely assumed that the European C om m is­
sion tried to encourage the formation of strong sectoral and intersectoral 
associations of business, it was unable to establish a corporatist culture l im ­
iting access to collective organizations and withholding it from firms. Also, 
trade unions were and continue to be present at European level only as 
lobbyists. Due to the weakness of the European quasi-state and the refusal of 
employers to take part, there is no collective bargaining in Europe above 
national systems in which, in addition, it is slowly eroding or weakening in 
a number of countries, especially at the sectoral level (Marginson and Sisson
2004).
Brussels, however, must not be regarded in isolation. As pointed out, 
rather than a political system like any other, the European Union is the 
upper layer o f  a unique multilevel-cum-multinational governance arrange­
ment and is adequately understood only as such, i.e. in its interaction with 
the growing number of national polities that continue to form its base. For 
interest representation, this means above all that the European Union offers 
many more and different access points than a normal polity, not just in 
Brussels with its complex institutional set-up but also through the national 
polities, with the relationship between the two levels being much less well- 
defined and much more in flux than in any national federal system. In part, 
the complicated logic of influence that derives from this is to do with the
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fact chat it continues to be the Council that is the — nationally divided — 
political centre of the Union. Council decisions may be influenced via the 
Commission or the European Parliament but also, and sometimes more 
effectively, through national governments (Greenwood 2003: 39ff.). This 
holds certainly where European-level decisions require unanimity. In this 
case if is enough for a group interested in preventing a given decision to 
avail itself of the support of just one member state -  which for business 
interests first was Thatcherist and, later, Blairist Brita in .19 While with 
majority voting a Council veto requires more than one country, it may still 
be expedient for interest groups to access European Union decisions in 
national capitals putting together a multinational veto coalition.
The structure of European business associations reflects the complexity of, 
and the continuing significance of  national states within, the de facto consti­
tution o f  the European multilevel regime, U N IC E ,  the peak association of 
European business, organizes national peak associations, not European-level 
sectoral associations. European business associations at the sectoral level exist 
apart from U N IC E  and are structurally unrelated to it. indeed lack o f  
coordination between U N IC E  and the various European sectoral associations 
represents a lasting problem for business interest representation at European 
level (Teuber forthcoming).'0 Moreover, while sectoral associations differ 
considerably in their resource endowment, many are under-resourced and 
nearly all are far less well endowed than their national m em b ers/ '  I f  the 
allocation of resources between different levels o f  organization can be taken 
as a proxy of the relative significance of the latter, it shows that in spite of 
all the talk of globalization, internationalization and Europeanization, the 
national level has remained central for organizing economic interests.
The weakness of business associations at the European as compared to the 
national level may also have to do with the fact that national traditions of 
interest organization are very different within the European Union (Grande 
2003: 53ff.; Platzer 1984: 166). This seems to make it difficult if not 
impossible politically to integrate national organizations closely into a 
common supranational format. One expression o f  national differences in tra­
ditions of associative action is differences in the amount of resources associ­
ations have available. Rich and well-established associations from corporatist 
countries thus may enjoy an important advantage when it comes to the dis­
tribution of influence and power in European associations. That advantage 
may enable them to protect their own freedom of  action, just as it may make 
weaker national associations reluctant to give up their independence in 
favour of an organization inevitably dominated by much better endowed 
member associations from other countries.
Empirical research and theoretical reasoning also suggest that national 
differences of interest continue to exist and may even increase within sectors, 
regardless and perhaps precisely because of the completion of the ‘Internal 
Market'. Thus a given industry may turn out to enjoy comparative advant­
age in some countries while losing out in others, which may result in its
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increasing geographical concentration, in this case, with prospering and 
declining firms located in different countries, it would seem difficult to 
combine their interests and, in particular, their national interest organi­
zations in an integrated supranational trade association. More likely, the 
evolution of  such an association would be blocked and the different national 
associations with their different interests would try their European luck on 
their own — unless the national association of the country winning the Stan- 
cloriwettbewerb would either take over or de facto turn into the sector’s Euro­
pean association (for an instructive example see Teuber, forthcoming).
Interest organization at the European level, to sum up, is much more 
fragmented and much less institutionally settled than at the national level 
(Grant 2002: 56ff.). The number of independent actors is higher, and there 
is less space for authority from above to impose coherence by coordination. 
This is further exacerbated by the fact that U N IC E  itself is far from sec- 
torally all-encompassing and has difficulties organizing small and m edium ­
sized firms as well as commerce and trade (Greenwood 2003; Platzer 1984). 
Most importantly, however, European business associations, including 
LTNICE as well as the sectoral associations, have to come to terms with the 
independent and often highly sophisticated lobbying activities o f  large 
firms. Some o f  these appear to expend sums on their Brussels offices that 
exceed the budget of many trade associations (Grant and Paterson 1994: 
143). There are even cases o f  large firms luring experienced staff away from 
their sectoral trade association to hire them as their own European lobbyists.
Large firms also organize their own business round tables, which exclude 
both smaller firms and the representatives o f  business associations (Green­
wood 2003 : 1 19ff-). The latter have little choice but to organize themselves 
around their ever more powerful large members. In return for staying on, 
large firms tend to demand opportunities for direct membership in what 
otherwise are European associations of national associations. They may also 
want to form special committees, which inevitably creates tensions with 
small and medium-sized firms envious of their influence.’2 Generally, as 
Coen (1997) and others have shown, many large firms tend to use the Brus­
sels business associations opportunistically as footholds in the European 
capital i f  they believe they need one; i f  not they circumvent them and act on 
their own.21 Add to this, as observed already by Streeck and Schmitter 
(1991), that even member states and subnational regions appear on the 
Brussels scene as active lobbyists defending their interests, making for a 
political environment that is extremely diversified and pluralist. This offers 
a great variety of opportunities for political access and coalition-building 
that was quite unknown in the more sedate settings of  west European nation 
states after 1945.
N ational business associations in the European multilevel polity
From the perspective of theories of organization and institutional change, it 
was always unrealistic to assume that national business associations would 
happily transfer their resources and decisional autonomy to supranational 
associations, only because European integration would shift decision-making 
power from the national to the supranational level. The inherent tendency of 
organizations to strive for their reproduction even in the face of changing 
external conditions, and generally the path dependency of social institutions, 
would inevitably have resulted in delayed rather than accelerated adjustment 
of the organization of collective interests to the progress of European 
integration. N ow  that such progress has been slower and, most importantly, 
in a different direction than originally expected, the persistence of  national 
business associations and their continuing strength in relation to their 
supranational extensions should not be seen as surprising any more.
In fact, it is not just their established control over their resources, their 
well-oiled organizations and the costs sunk in them that protect the position 
of national business associations in, and in spite of, a more integrated 
Europe. Another condition militating against the weakening of national 
associations and their eventual absorption by European ones is the problem­
atic compatibility  o f  different national traditions of interest organization 
and interest politics. Corporatist and pluralist organizations function differ­
ently and cannot easily be merged. As the result of attempts at merger is 
uncertain, it is less risky to reserve one’s own proven capacities and operate if 
necessary through two channels. In addition, there are at least three other 
factors that have prevented and are likely further to prevent a decisive weak­
ening of  the national level of interest politics in the European Union.
First, as stated above, among the many points of access the European 
Union offers to actors interested in its decisions are the national capitals, 
whose representatives continue to be the dominant players in the governance 
of the Union. As a consequence, European business associations, including 
□ N I C E  and the various sectoral peak associations, more often than not 
depend on their national affiliates to intercede with their national govern­
m ents ,24 so that the Council gets an impending decision ‘right ’ from the 
perspective of European business.21 It is obvious that such dependency 
strengthens the role of  national associations within their European peak 
associations, mirroring the strong position of national governments inside 
the Union.
Second, economic sectors continue to differ in structure and performance 
between countries, even in an integrated world economy. To the extent that 
different institutional and other conditions in different countries make for 
differences in the competitiveness of firms, the interests of the latter in rela­
tion to supranational decision making may be too heterogeneous to allow for 
joint representation through a unified European association. Competition 
may also lead to specialization within and between sectors. In the former case,
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firms in one country may specialize on subsectors that may have very different 
interests with respect to legal or political regulation than other subsectors (for 
the retail industry, see Teuber forthcoming). For example, if  bulk chemicals 
are produced in some countries while fine chemicals' or pharmaceuticals are 
produced in others, national sectoral interests with respect to environmental 
policy may differ so much that they cannot be represented by one and the 
same association.26 Finally, specialization between sectors may result in con­
centration of a particular industry in one member state, or a small subset of 
member states. This would make it very difficult for a European association 
to prevent its respective national member associations from bypassing it and 
entering into direct relations with European Union agencies.27
Third, not only do European-level associations often find it hard or 
impossible to represent a common supranational view. In addition, Euro­
pean authorities are willing to speak, not just to individual multinational 
firms, but also to national associations from individual member states. As 
these are in contact with their governments, which in turn are dominant 
actors in Brussels, this is not surprising. Often European associations cannot 
deliver the quality o f  expertise that national associations can provide. More­
over, if nationally-based interests are too diverse, European associations 
cannot produce a coherent non-trivial policy position, and consultation with 
the relevant national players will be required for meaningful decision 
making. Direct: national access also reflects the openness and multiple acces­
sibility of the Brussels machinery o f  governance, which leaves a lot of space 
for interest-political entrepreneurialism, not just of professional lobbyists 
and large individual firms, bur also o f  associations of less than full European 
scope.
Rather than going away, national business associations, sectoral as well as 
cross-sectoral ones, have expanded their — inevitably national -  strategies 
into the European arena. ITere they act, not according to a European ideo­
logy, but in pursuit of nationally based interests interpreted in a European 
context. National business associations often and, if they command enough 
resources, typically do this through European offices o f  their own that liaise 
with all sorts o f  other actors, from the Permanent Representation of their 
home country to the different levels o f  the Commission, the European Par­
liament, the lobbying establishments of large firms and, importantly, the 
head offices o f  the very same European-level peak associations to which 
national associations are affiliated. Moreover, European action of national 
associations includes the selective formation of, as it were, horizontal 
alliances with other national associations outside the purview o f  European 
peak associations, even those o f  which all parties are members. I f  anything, 
it is the increased capacity of national actors for international action that is 
emblematic of that multifaceted process referred to in the academic liter­
ature and in everyday parlance as ‘Europeanization’.
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The ‘'Europeanization'' o f interest politics
In the history of research and theorizing on European integration, Euro­
peanization has come to mean a great number o f  things. Originally it seems 
to have meant the expected dissolution of national institutions and identities 
into a more or less federal, but in any case unified, European political system 
(Haas 1958). More recently, the concept is used to refer to a gradual restruc­
turing of national polities and policies from above, by European legislation, 
court decisions and ‘benchmarking’, issuing in a reorganization o f  national 
regimes according to norms originating at the upper level o f  the European 
multilevel system. The end result of this process is supposed to be conver­
gence of national, political and administrative systems on a common Euro­
pean template. To us, looking at the ongoing transformation of  systems of 
interest representation in Europe, this image of European integration seems 
by far too top-down and mechanistic.
Given what we have observed in this book and elsewhere, if  Europeaniza­
tion as a concept is to be useful at all, it must be reformulated once again 
and become more actor-centred. By this we mean that it must reflect the 
strategic dimension that is essential to the adjustment of originally national 
collective and individual actors to the progress of European economic and 
institutional integration, i.e. to the specifically European version of inter­
nationalization. Far from passively receiving and obeying decisions of the 
new agencies that have arisen above the nation state, and changing their 
views and ways accordingly, national actors as we see them respond to the 
growth of international transactions and institutions as to an additional 
parameter for their strategic action and, ultimately, self-definition. As they 
experience increasingly frequent transactions across national borders and 
perceive growing opportunities in taking part in them, national firms, 
associations and governments adopt an international perspective and begin 
to conceive of  their location in an increasingly transnational context as a 
defining characteristic of themselves: they become national players on a 
playing field, Europe, that extends beyond the borders o f  their own country. 
How they move in this environment, and what goals they choose to pursue 
in it, is not something that they will allow others to determine, not even, 
and perhaps precisely not, a supranational agency or peak association of 
which they are simply one client or member among others.
Europeanization, as we see it happening, does not in principle preclude 
that actors may at some point rescind their national constitution and d is­
solve into more encompassing, denationalized collectivities, provided they 
find these better suited for containing the risks and opening up the 
opportunities o f  internationalization. But this is far from the only possible 
response, and indeed now it seems to be among the least likely. A  concept of  
Europeanization that accords the national actors undergoing It an active 
capacity would lead one to expect not uniformity but difference: driven by 
different national starting points, structurally-based interests and strategic
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choices. The changes that will result from this must be empirically traced 
rather than theoretically predicted. The extended strategic reach that 
accompanies internationalization may undo old constraints, such as obliga­
tions to participate in corporatist interest intermediation. But it may also 
create new ones, like those associated with supranational competition law, 
just as it may open up new opportunities, for example possibilities for stra­
tegic and tactical alliances with actors outside one’s own country that previ­
ously seemed to be without practical significance. Old goals may become 
unrealistic, but then some o f  the new possibilities that are gradually being 
discovered may be turned into new goals. Similarly, proven means may cease 
to be available, but others may turn up that may usefully be deployed in 
pursuit of old or new objectives.
In other words, for Europeanization o f  interest politics to be a reality, it is 
not necessary at all for the resources of European business associations to 
exceed the combined resources o f  their national constituents -  and the fact 
that they do not, and very likely never will, is no proof of national parochial“ 
ism or o f  ignorance of the consequences of internationalization. N or is there 
reason to treat as an anomaly — or as a transitory condition on the way 
towards ‘real’ Europeanization -  what has long become a normal and stable 
feature of business interest representation in Europe, namely the presence in 
Brussels of bureaus o f  national sectoral or intersectoral trade associations that 
operate separately from the bureaus of their respective European-level associ­
ations. The same is true for the fact that there are and continue to be major 
differences in the European presence of different sectors, and especially in 
the way national and European organizations relate to one another, and it 
holds similarly for the absence of an intersectoral European peak association 
organizing the European-level sectoral peak associations. That integrated 
Europe is not an integrated polity on the model of national polities does not 
imply at all that actors do not take the reality of  integration into account 
when pursuing their interests; it only means that they do this in their own 
way, proceeding from where they are instead o f  from where ‘theory’ tells 
them they will have to be.
Notes
1 W e wish to express our gratitude to Jö rg  Ten her for competent research assis­
tance.
2 For a more elaborate presentation of this concept and related ones, see the Intro­
duction, this volume.
3 An interesting parallel exists on the side of trade unions. Here, too, it seems 
that the literature on neo-corporatism has underestimated the demand of 
members of interest organizations for political participation, while overestim at­
ing the capacity of established associations to generate member com mitment 
without a minim um  of organizational democracy. See Baccaro (2002).
4  Mergers, according to Boleac (2002: 87), are bad news for trade associations. 
Am ong other things, mergers tend to lower an association’s subscription 
income. Usually subscription scales are capped. When two member firms
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merge, the new firm will likely pay less than the two had paid together before 
rhe merger. Associations m ust react to this by reducing expenditure or seeking 
to increase revenue from other sources. They may also on their part try to merge 
with associations in rhe same or an adjacent sector.
5 Interestingly in the 1970s it seems to have been the other way around. Where 
mergers between trade and employer associations were considered, they were 
basically conceived as a takeover o f the former by the latter. This may have 
reflected the strength of die trade union movement at the tim e which resulted 
in an increase o f national labour market regulation, by law or collective agree­
ment. This in turn gave primacy to the labour market interests of employers 
over the product market interests of producers, especially since firms were less 
exposed to international competition than today (see Btihrer 1989'- 157ff., on 
the attem pted merger o f the German peak associations BD I and BDA).
6 Independent parallel evolution in response to sim ilar pressures in the absence of 
cross-national diffusion or joint action was also found with respect to organi­
zational changes in postwar trade unions in Germany and the Netherlands 
(Streeck and Visser 1998). This testifies to the continuing importance o f 
national borders and legacies. Given the manifold international contacts and the 
increasing internationalization o f business, the national embeddedness of its 
organizations may seem more surprising than in the case oflabour.
7 Sellière’s motto, frequently repeated in his notorious press conferences, was ‘dire 
sans prudence ce que pensent les entrepreneurs français’.
8 D ’Am ato's appointm ent by Confindustria’s General Council deeply divided the 
organization and did not have the support of the large industrial firms and the 
powerful federations o f large industry. He was not given a second term and in 
2004 the organization elected Luca di Montezemolo, who is close to the Fiat 
dynasty and nor him self an entrepreneur. This was widely seen as an attem pt to 
repair the dam age in the relationship with the unions and put a distance 
between Confindustria and the Berlusconi government.
9 The French intersectoral business and employer association, M ED EF, was able 
to introduce direct m embership of large firms in its most recent constitutional 
reform because in most sectors small firms had already established strong peak 
associations o f their own. This holds for the Netherlands as well, although the 
separate organization o f small firms may also be seen as die result o f direct m em ­
bership and the consequently enhanced influence o f large firms in confederations 
representing small firms as well.
10 This is a point made for example by Pestoff and by Grote and Schneider in this 
volume. A contrasting view is that o f Greenwood (2003), who claims that no 
one in an international firm knows what the local subscription fees are, and that 
association m embership is one of rhe last areas o f the activities o f firms where 
hard-headed cost-evaluation methods are not used. But this may apply more to 
the low cost European associations than to the more expensive national associ­
ations, especially in the case o f employer associations or associations with dual 
functions.
1 1 In the autom obile industry foreign-ovvned producers are often only informally or 
not at all involved in national or European-level trade associations. They are 
m ost firmly integrated in the German association whereas in Britain, U S m ulti­
nationals have abstained from membership (Teuber forthcoming).
12 The equivalent at the European level was the Centre for European Policy 
Studies, which was founded in the 1980s by large companies (Cowles 1994: 
168).
1 3 Dutch peak associations and m ultinational firms have unwaveringly promoted 
rhe same cause, but somewhat less aggressively and publicly. Presumably this
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was because they were well served by the liberal marker policies o f their govern­
ment that had the backing of the unions during the successful phase o f Dutch 
‘supply-side corporatism ’ in the 1990s.
14 There is also a separate trade association o f industrialists in Austria. It plays only 
a minor role next to the all-embracing Chamber o f  Industry and Commerce, 
which has obligatory membership and represents both trade and employer inter­
ests.
15 As noted above, the resilience o f German employer associations, especially in the 
metal sector, may also be explained by their enormous wealth. The national 
peak association of Germ an employers, BD A , receives approximately one half o f 
its revenue from Gesam tm etall. In part this reflects the relatively slow deindus­
trialization of Germany, which in turn is due to the high international competi­
tiveness of its exposed industrial sector. N ote that in Sweden, a smaller country- 
which, in addition, progressed much faster on the road to a service economy, the 
similarly rich financial endowment of national employer associations did not 
save these from consolidation.
16 As we will argue further on, this is how it has worked on the European level.
17 This has interesting consequences even for the mobilization o f associational 
resources (Boleat 2002: 86). More often than not, business associations are con­
strained by their smaller member firms to place a ceiling on the financial contri­
butions large firms are allowed to make, so as to protect the association from 
becoming overly dependent on them. The contradiction between this and the 
strong desire of the small firms for the large ones to subsidize collective action 
and individual services is obvious.
18 In France, Mr Selliere, who came from one of the largest financial holding com ­
panies with stakes throughout industry and services, provides another example.
19 As has often been stated, the great strategic advantage o f business in European 
politics is that its interest is more in preventing than in shaping the building of 
European-level institutions, especially as regards industrial relations, employ­
ment policy and social protection.
20 In other words, the architecture o f the functional representation of business 
interests in Europe remains open at the top, indicating the weakness of the 
European polity as a reference point for political organization at the class level. 
One m ight also speak of an unresolved pluralism  of national and sectoral inter­
ests existing next ro each other at the level o f the European Union. Something 
like this is also found within sectors. The Council o f European Employers of the 
Metal, Engineering and Technology-based Industries (CEEM ET), formerly the 
West European Metal Employers (W EM ), finds it difficult to prevent independ­
ent associations in subsectors such as shipbuilding, aircraft production or car 
manufacturing from dealing directly with the Com m ission or with national 
governments and trade unions.
21 Greenwood et al. (1999) observe that almost half o f  all European associations 
have no more than two staff members. 'Most EU business associations remain 
chronically under-resourced and are thus ill-equipped to perform the tasks 
demanded of them' (Tyszkiewicz 2002: 171). The same applies to the trade 
unions.
22 In peak associations, tensions also arise with member associations. In the late 
1980s, the influence of large m ultinational firms in U N iC E  was institutional­
ized by the creation o f the U N IC E  Advisory and Support Group, which is 
funded by the participating firms themselves and directly. Especially British, 
Dutch and American hrms make use o f this platform . The national peak associ­
ations, which are the formal constituents of U N IC E , agreed to the formation 
of the Group only after some hrms had threatened to reduce their national
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membership lees (Cowles 1994: 179ff.). Especially the German and the French 
national peak associations fought to defend their monopoly of representation 
inside U N IC E. After the reform they tried to make their domestic firms channel 
their contributions to U N IC F through their national associations (Cowles 1994: 
181).
23 ‘Thus according to the issues, the big company will wear the EU trade associ­
ation’s hat when it has an interest m doing so. Conversely, it will undertake its 
own lobbying actions when this is to its advantage’ (Gueguen 2002: 5 1).
24 Even here, according to a knowledgeable source, ‘much essential work is left 
undone and the political potential of concerted and timely action at national 
level is left unexploited" (Tyszkiewicz 2002: 171).
25 The same gam e is often played by multinational firms trying to coordinate the 
lobbying activities of their national subsidiaries in the interest of the firm as a 
whole. Firms may also make themselves available to associations for this sort of 
coordinated European lobbying of national capitals.
26 A sim ilar case would be the auto industry. British firms now produce exclus­
ively supply parts rather than whole automobiles (which are produced in Britain 
by foreign subsidiaries). The interests (if suppliers may differ from those of final 
assemblers o f automobiles. Where subsectoral divisions come to coincide with 
geographic: or national divisions, unified supranational interest organization 
seems difficult to achieve, and national associations may have to begin to play a 
supranational role.
27 Thus German chemical industry associations are aware of the fact that the Euro­
pean chemical industry is essentially concentrated in only four countries whereas 
the European sectoral peak association, CFFIC , encompasses the entire European 
Union as well as other countries. While in the postwar decades German inter­
ests could effectively be articulated at an international level only through m ulti­
lateral channels, today this is no longer necessarily the case. As a consequence 
German national associations increasingly rely on independent European action, 
sometimes in variable alliances with associations from countries that happen to 
have identical interests on a particular matter.
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